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I
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY RODGERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 15334
v.
ANNIE N. HANSEN and
ALBERT J. HANSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to quiet title, under the doctrine of
equitable mortgage, to property located at 412 North 300 West in
Salt Lake City, more particularly described as follows:
COMMENCING at a point 5 rods North of the
Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 121, Plat
"A", Salt Lake City Survey, and running
thence East 153 feet; thence North 2-1/2
rods; thence West 153 feet; thence South 21/2 rods to the place of beginning.
Together with and subject to a right of way
over:
Commencing at a point 153 feet East of
the Southwest corner of said Lot 2, and
running thence North 10 rods; thence West 10
feet; thence South 10 rods; thence East 10
feet to the place of beginning.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court on September 23, 1976,
with judgment being entered in favor of defendants on March 25,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(R. 123-124).

The court dismissed plaintiff's complaint

with prejudice and upon the merits and granted judgment for
defendants on their counterclaim; title to a two-thirds inter'"'
in the subject property was quieted in defendants and a

trust~

impressed upon the one-third interest owned by plaintiff (Id.).
On June 15, 1977, the court denied plaintiff's motion to set
aside the judgment or,
131).

in the alternative,

for a new trial (R.

Plaintiff now appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/appellant seeks reversal of the judgment anc

judgment in her favor as a matter of law or, that failing, a oc
trial.
that,

In any event, plaintiff/appellant seeks a determination
if the judgment should stand in all other respects, she i:

entitled to a one-half interest in the subject property rather
than to a one-third interest as found by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 25, 1942, William and Vivian Newsome

enter~

into a Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. 1-P) with Harold and
Myrtle Neil, the Neils agreeing to purchase from the Newsornes f::
$3,250.00 the property which is the subject matter of this litic
tion.

Although the receipts for the $400. 00 down payment (Ex.

12-D) and for a number of the payments in the amount of $325.0C
under the foregoing contract (Ex.

9-D)

are made out to Haroldi

Neil and/or Myrtle C. Neil, the defendants claimed and the cour:
found

(R. 110) that these payments were made by the defendants.

Nevertheless, these payments were not in the nature of a busF,:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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deal but rather were made by the defendants, the Neils' daughter
and son-in-law, out of a feeling of love and family responsibility (Tr. 78); repayment by Harold and Myrtle Neil was never
discussed (Tr. 67, 78).

The defendants have based no claim of an

interest in this property upon these payments under the Uniform
Real Estate Contract of 1942.
Subsequent to entering into the real estate contract,
Mr. Neil died in 1942 (R. 19-20).

Apparently, Mrs. Neil experienced

difficulty in providing the payments for the property and sought
help from the Hansens.

It is undisputed that the Hansens provided

the funds to pay off the full amount due to the Newsomes under
the real estate contract, $2,389.00 (See paragraph 2 of Stipulation of September 22, 1976--R. 96), and that on July 7, 1944, the
Newsomes executed a warranty deed (Ex. 2-P) conveying the subject
property "to Myrtle C. Neil and Annie N. Hansen and Albert J.
Hansen, her husband, as joint tenants and not as tenants in
common."

The significance of these actions, however, is in

dispute.
The Hansens maintain that they purchased outright a
two-thirds interest in the property when making the $2,389 payment
and that the reason for the joint tenancy wording was so that if
one of the three should die the other two would still own the
property (Tr. 72, 73).
~rs.

They claim that they made no loan to

Neil (Tr. 87) and that they never agreed to reconvey their

interest to her (Tr. 73, 88).

Shirley Rodgers, the successor in

interest to Mrs. Neil, however, contends that a loan and mortgage
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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j

~

arrangement was exactly what was anticipated by the parties;
other words, the deed absolute on its face was intended as a
mortgage with Mrs. Neil taking taking title subject to the
mortgage interest of the Newsomes.
After the execution of the warranty deed, Mrs. Neil
maintained sole possession of the property until she died on
August 24, 1975 (Tr. 20).

She paid the real property taxes (See

Tr. 24-25 and Ex. 10-P) and also paid the maintenance and upkeef
(See Tr. 26 and Ex. 11-P).

Furthermore, she believed that the

property, her home, was hers and that the arrangement of the
names of the grantees on the warranty deed was very misleading
(Tr. 30).
Of even more importance, Mrs. Neil started making
payments to the Han sens almost immediately.

These payments are

evidenced by a series of 43 receipts (Ex. 6-P) which bear the
signature of and were executed by defendant Annie N. Hansen (See
T~H

paragraph 3 of Stipulation of September 22, 1976--R. 96).

receipts all indicate that the payments they evidence were "hous;
payments," often also indicating the address of the subject
property.

The first receipt in the series reflects a "Previous

Balance" of $2,389. 00, the exact amount paid to the Newsomes, ar,:
each of the payments reflect the amount paid being deducted tror,
that figure which is then reduced to reflect a new "Balance

D~

Although most of these receipts evidence payments of $25.00, man:·
are for different amounts ranging from $7.50 to $70.00.

Also,

al though most of these receipts are to Myrtle Neil, the last W
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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beginning with an unnumbered receipt dated June 8, 1948, are to
Myrtle Yeaman, reflecting the fact that she married one Nathan
Thomas Yeaman in 1948 (Tr. 20).

The final receipt in the series

is dated August 5, 1949, and shows a balance then due to the
Hansens from Mrs. Neil of $1,055.00.
In 1958, apparently upset by a potential sale of the
property arranged by the Hansens, Mrs. Neil contacted an attorney,
Emmett L. Brown, who on September 29, 1958, wrote a letter to
the Hansens (Ex. 13-P) in which he pointed out that Mrs. Neil had
paid back a large amount of the money advanced by the Hansens.
On September 30, 1958, Mrs. Hansen wrote a reply (Ex. 14-P)
which, although generally incoherent, acknowledged receipt of
payments by Mrs. Neil.
On February 12, 1964, in an effort to destroy any
possible joint tenancy that might have been construed under the
aforementioned warranty deed (Tr. 29-30), Mrs. Neil conveyed by
quitclaim deed (Ex. 4-P) all of her right, title, estate and
interest in the subject property to her daughter Shirley Rodgers,
the plaintiff/appellant.

Mrs. Rodgers, on that same date,

reconveyed by quitclaim deed (Ex. 3-P) the same right, title,
estate and interest to Mrs. Neil.
As noted above, Mrs. Neil considered the property hers
and found the wording of the warranty deed misleading.

This

troubled her and was on her mind constantly, especially in the
last seven to ten years of her life (Tr. 27, 47-48).

In an

effort to clear matters up she met with the Hansens at their home
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the sununer of 1968 (Tr. 30 et seq.).

An effort was made at

that meeting to determine the amount due to the Hansens in orde;
that Mrs. Neil might clear up any title problem (Tr. 32-33).
Even though the last receipt in 1949 had shown a balance

due~

the property of $1, 055. 00, Mrs. Neil stated that she believed s:,
owed only about $250, more or less, because she had not always
received receipts when making payments (Tr. 33; see also Tr. 46i
In answer, Mrs. Hansen stated that more than that was due (Tr. i:
and Mr. Hansen indicated interest was due even though the
agreement was for an interest-free loan (Tr. 34).

orig~

Nothing,

however, was resolved then (Tr. 34).
After the 1968 meeting, Mrs. Neil did not institute an:
legal proceedings because she was ill and did not wish to take
her own daughter to court (Tr. 35).

Instead, she executed a

second quitclaim deed in favor of Mrs. Rodgers (Ex. 5-P) on
May 21, 1971, so that she might eventually resolve the matter.
The lower court ruled that Mrs. Rodgers did not take this intere'
as an individual but rather as a trustee with the property or it'
proceeds to be distributed by her in accordance with the will ci
Mrs. Neil (Ex. 8-D) which was executed on May 10, 197 4.

Plaint::

appellant does not dispute that such was her mother's intent.
Mrs. Neil died on August 24, 1975.

Within days

aft~

the death of Mrs. Neil, the mother of both Shirley Rodgers and
Annie Hansen, Mrs. Rodgers attempted to settle the question of
title to the subject property with defendants.

Unable to

do~'

plaintiff commenced this quiet title action by filing the comp:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R. 2-4) on September 12, 1975, less than three weeks following
the death of Mrs. Neil.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE COURT, AS TO
TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY,
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.
This case is essentially to quiet title to the subject
property in Shirley Rodgers based upon the fact that she holds
title, as did her mother and predecessor in interest Myrtle C.
Neil, subject only to an equitable mortgage in Annie and Albert
Hansen.

It is Mrs. Rodgers' contention that in 1944 the Hansens

agreed to loan Mrs. Neil the money to pay off the Newsomes and
acquire title to the subject property; that Mrs. Neil in turn
agreed to secure repayment by

listing the Hansens as joint

tenants of the property until such time as she repaid the loan to
them, and this in fact was done as reflected in the warranty deed
of 1944 (Ex. 2-P).

At all times, however, Mrs. Neil was to be

considered the sole owner in fee simple of the property subject
only to the lien held by the Hansens, with the relationship to be
that of mortgagor and mortagees, not joint tenants.
This contention by plaintiff is based in the concept of
equitable mortgage.

An equitable mortgage is not characterized

by the standard legal niceties which one associates with a formal

written legal mortgage filed at the County Recorder's office.

In

fact, an equitable mortgage need not even be evidenced by writing.
Rather, an equitable mortgage is based upon the totality of the

-7-
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transaction and is referable to the maxim that equity consider,
that as done which ought to be done.

5 5 Am. Jur. 2d (<Jortgages

§.

at 200.
The basic concepts of equitable mortgage can be
in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages

§

fou~

13 at 42-44, wherein it is stated:

[G)enerally, whenever a transaction resolves
itself into a security, or an offer or attempt
to pledge land as security for a debt or
liability, equity will treat it as a mortgage,
without regard to the form it may assume, or
the name the parties may choose to give it.
In applying the doctrine of equitable mortgages
doubts are resolved in favor of the transaction
being a mortgage.
In order that an equitable mortgage may
exist it is essential that the mortgagor have
a mortgageable interest in the property
sought to be charged as security, and that
there be clear proof of the sum which it was
to secure.
It is absolutely essential to its
existence that there be a definite debt,
obligation, or liability to be secured, due
from the mortgagor to the mortgagee.
It is
not necessary, however, that the debt secured
should be evidenced by notes, bonds, or any
other written obligation or promise to pay.

* * *
. The doctrine of equitable mortgages
has been held not to be limited to written
instruments intended as mortgages, but to
extend to a variety of parol transactions.
Where equity and good conscience so require,
such a mortgage may be found, even though no
writing exists.
The concept of equitable mortgage has been recognized in Utah,
most notably in Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 468-69, 189 P.2ci
118, 122 (1948), wherein it is stated:

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It is true, of course, that a warranty deed,
absolute in form, is presumed to convey a fee
simple title, or at least whatever title the
granter has.
But where, as here, there is a
written agreement between the parties, contemporaneous with the deed, which shows the
deed to have been given for security purposes,
the court will look to the real transaction
and treat it as a mortgage. Brown v. Skeen,
89 Utah 568, 58 P.2d 24.
-(I]n equity a deed absolute upon
its face may be shown by a parol evidence to
have been given for security purposes only,
and when such a showing has been made, equity
will give effect to the intention of the
parties.
Such security transactions, lacking
the requisites of a formal mortgage, are
termed equitable mortgages.
1 Jones on
Mortgages, Chapter 5; Wasatch Min. Co. v.
Jennins, 5 Utah 243, 251, 15 P. 65; Duerden v.
Solomon, 33 Utah 468, 94 P. 978; Hess v.
Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P. 232.
See also 3
Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 2d Edition,
page 2793, Section 1531.
See also Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39, 43, 492 P.2d 1343, 1346
(1972); Kjar v. Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972).
Admittedly, the cases in Utah which have involved an equitable
mortgage dealt with a deed absolute on its face in which the
granter himself wished to create a mortgagor-mortgagee, rather
than granter-grantee, relationship and that is not the case here.
However, as noted above, the concept extends to a variety of
parol transactions, including advancing purchase money to one who
is buying property and he, in turn, has the lender listed as
grantee.

This is set forth in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 14e. at 47 as

follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If a person who has contracted for the
purchase of land procures another to lend him
all or part of the money necessary to make
the payments, or to advance it for him, and
has the deed made to the latter, with an agreement that he will convey the title to the
former on repayment of the amount advanced,
the transaction will amount to an equitable
mortgage if it was the understanding and intention
of the parties that the one should become debtor
to the other for the money advanced, and that
the land should be held merely as security for
this debt.
Clearly, in light of the foregoing, it is the intent:
the transaction, and not the use of "magic words" like "rnortgac;
or "lien," that is important in determining the existence of an
equitable mortgage.

This is especially true in a case

s~ch

this one where we are dealing with a transaction entered

as

in~

by persons of limited education (Tr. 52-53).
Therefore, if the evidence indicated a transaction
between Mrs. Neil and the Hansens, as described above, an equit::
mortgage was created and Mrs. Neil took title in the prope:ty
subject only to that equitable mortgage in the Hansens.
The basic factors which needed to be shown to estabL
that relationship, based on the principles cited above from
C.J.S., were a mortgageable interest in the property and a
definite debt secured by the property.

The evidence clearly

indicates that Hrs. Neil, at all relevant times, had an intere 5•
in the property, first under the 1942 real estate contract
1-P) and then under the 1944 warranty deed (Ex. 2-P).

(E:(.

As far''

the debt is concerned, the series of 43 receipts (Ex. 6-P)
amounted to clear and convincing evidence thereof and formed'.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

backbone of appellant's case below.

Contrary to his findings and

conclusions, Judge Leary himself even indicated that these
receipts evidenced payments from Mrs. Neil to the Hansens commencing almost contemporaneously with the execution of the warranty
deed (Tr. 64).

However, this Court need not be bound by any

findings below as to these receipts.

In Lake v. Hermes Associates,

552 P. 2d 126, 128 (Utah 1976), it is stated:
[W]here the resolution of the controversy
depends upon meaning to be given documents,
the trial court is in no more favored position and is no better able to determine the
meaning of such documents than is this court.
Receipt number one, dated October 20, 1944, itself
fairly well sets out the entire transaction.

It indicates that

the Hansens received a payment of $25.00 from Mrs. Neil
payment on house 415 N. 2nd West."

'~For

It states the "Previous

Balance"as $2,389, the exact amount paid to the Newsomes.

The

$25 payment is then deducted, leaving a "Balance Due" of $2,364,
the exact amount which appears as the "Previous Balance" on
receipt number two, dated November 29, 1944.

The back of the

first receipt also reflects the transaction, both with the
Newsomes and between Mrs. Neil and the Hansens.

In fact, it even

indicates that the loan to Mrs. Neil was to be interest-free.
Written on the back of the receipt is the following:
Save 12.70 a month
interest
interest
12.70
princible (sic] 12.30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In accordance with that, each payment reflected by the receipts
is deducted in full from the amount listed as the previous
balance.

These receipts show that Mrs. Neil was making

pa~eM!

to the Hansens for the amount advanced to her by them and that
they were acknowledging receipt of those payments and reducing
the amount due from her.

No other explanation can be made of

these receipts, a fact recognized in the 1958 letter from Emet
Brown to the Hansens (Ex. 13-P) in which he stated:
As you are well aware, Mrs. Neil has paid you
back out of this sum, approximately $1,100.00,
and if it were your intent to have the twothirds interest in this home, it is hard to
understand the basis upon which she would be
paying you back that amount of money.
Bro~~

No explanation by the Hansens was given to Mr.
1958, other than Mrs. Hansen acknowledging:
My Mother paid us when ever however she
wanted 600.00 Between 1944 And 1948 No questions asked & she paid no interest.
[See Ex.
14-P.]

Similarly, when her deposition was taken on November 10, 1976,
Mrs. Hansen not only denied receiving payments from her mother
but also denied ever giving her any receipts (See generally
Transcript of Deposition of Annie N. Hansen at 11-13).

And she

specifically denied knowing what the purpose of said receipts,"
they existed, might be:

Q
If .
your mother had made payments
that were deducted from the balance of $2,389.,
do you know what purposes those payments would
have been for?
A
I don't know.
[Transcript of Deposition
of Annie N. Hansen at 13.]
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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However, by the time Mrs. Hansen testified at the trial of this
matter, she had developed an explanation.
At trial, Mrs. Hansen testified that the receipts, the
entire series, were part of an elaborate welfare fraud scheme
(Tr. 85 et seq.).

She claimed the receipts were given to "get

money from the Welfare"

(Tr. 86) and that they were for $25 in

order to get a housing allowance in that amount (Tr. 91).
However, she could not explain why certain receipts were for
other amounts, such as $30, $7, $45 or $70 (Tr. 91, 92-94).
Also, she claimed the receipts stopped in 1949 because her mother
"got married to Thomas Yeaman" and could no longer receive the
welfare housing allowance (Tr. 86), yet the last ten of the
receipts, issued between June 8, 1948, and August 5, 1949, were
made out to "Myrtle Yeaman"

(See Ex. 6-P).

Not only was Mrs. Hansen's story a complete surprise to
Mrs. Rodgers and her counsel (Tr. 103) and ridiculously inconsistent, it was evidence which could form no basis whatsoever for
the lower court's decision.
§

In 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit

301 at 397 it is stated as the general rule that:
No one will be permitted in a court of justice
to take advantage of, or claim protection by
reason of, his own fraud

Similarly, in Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 447, 464 P.2d 598,
602 (1970), it is stated:
(U]nder the doctrine or principle of estoppel
in pais o~e may by his acts or conduct away
from the court prevent himself from denying
in court the effect or result of those acts.
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Clearly, the Han sens cannot hope to profit from what
they assert was a fraud upon the state.

They cannot admit to

Emmett Brown that Mrs. Neil made payments to them on the house
and even deny under oath the very existence of these

receipts~

then come into court and claim that no payments were made and
that the receipts were only the device by which they helped
perpetrate a welfare fraud.

The Hansens must be bound by the

inferences to be drawn from these receipts.

Those inferences

that they made an interest-free loan to Mrs. Neil, in

ar-

order~~

she might acquire title to the subject property, which loan ns
secured by the property itself, and that she made payments to
them on the loan, at least 43 of which are evidenced by the
receipts themselves.

No other reasonable explanation can be

derived from the evidence presented to the lower court which
erred in ruling as it did.
POINT I I
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS WAS APPLICABLE
TO THIS CASE.
The lower court erroneously concluded this action was:
case in the nature of specific performance of an agreement to
sell the Hansens' interest in the subject property to Mrs. NeE
and that such an agreement violates the statute of frauds, ~
Code Annotated § 25-5-1 (1976)

(R. 113) in that the receipts (Ex

6-P) were insufficient to take the alleged agreement out of t~
statute of frauds, either as a written memorandum or under the
doctrine of part performance (R. 114).

This conclusion clearl;
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is erroneous because, as noted above, the doctrine of equitable
mortgages is not limited to written instruments but rather
extends to a variety of parol transactions even though no writing
exists.

59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 13 at 43-44.

In other words, the

law says an equitable mortgage may be found even though no writing
exists.

Nevertheless, the court said no equitable mortgage could

be found because there was no writing.

Furthermore, under the

doctrine of equitable mortgage, Mrs. Neil was the sole owner of
the property and the Hansens had no interest, as either joint
tenants or tenants in common, to sell to her.

Therefore, Mrs. Neil

could not have entered into a contract to buy the Hansens'
"interest" from them and the transaction, from its inception, was
outside the statute of frauds.
Assuming, arguendo, that the statute of frauds could·be
considered applicable to this transaction, the receipts (Ex. 6-P)
taken together should be a sufficient writing.

They indicate the

amount to be paid, starting in 1944 at $2,389.00 and being
reduced each time a payment was made by the full amount paid.
They clearly are denoted as "house payments" often also including
the address to indicate exactly which house.

Both the indication

on the back of receipt number one and the fact that the full
amount paid was deducted each time from the previous balance
reflect the fact the loan was interest-free.

Finally, they are

all signed by Annie N. Hansen, the party to be bound.
Assuming further that this is still not sufficient to
take this transaction out of the statute of frauds, the receipts
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surely show part performance sufficient to take the transacti::
out of the statute.

And part performance will, in a si tuatiori

like this, avoid the statute of frauds.

In re Madsen's

123 Utah 316, 340, 259 P.2d 595, 601 (1953).

Estat~

Clearly, the

receipts indicate "house payments" being made over the course:.
almost five years under the terms outlined above.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM WAS BARRED BY
BOTH STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
AND THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES.
Plaintiff/appellant maintains that her quiet titleequitable mortgage action was not barred either by any statute·
limitations, if it might be construed as a legal action, or by
the doctrine of laches.

Nevertheless, the lower court concluc:.

that both were applicable (R. 114) .

To find either applicable

to this case is baffling; to find both applicable is clearly
contradictory.
To find statutes of limitations applicable in this
particular case overlooks the fact that a quiet title action

i;

basically equitable and, therefore, not barred by any statute::
limitations.

Furthermore, it overlooks the fact that the unde:

lying theory here, that of equitable mortgage, is also obvi~~
equitable and not subject to statutes of limitations.
the specific statutes of limitations found by the lower

Finau;·,
court~

apply, Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-12-25 and 78-12-26(3), seem:
be curiously inappropriate.

Admittedly, § 78-12-25(2) covers

"(a] n action for relief not otherwise provided for by law" ar.c
-16-
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there is no limitation statute directly applicable to either a
quiet title or equitable mortgage action.

Nevertheless, those

are real property actions and the entire of Article 1 to Chapter 12 of Title 78

(Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-12-2 to 78-12-21)

relates to limitations in real property actions, but the court
did not find any of these applicable.

Likewise, actions based in

fraud and mistake are the essence of § 78-12-26(3) and plaintiff/
appellant has never claimed fraud or mistake to be applicable
here.
If either of the bars to an action, limitations or
laches, is appropriate here, it would have to be laches since
this is clearly an equitable action.

However, it has been held

in Jacobs v. Perry, 135 Colo. 550, 313 P.2d 1008, 1012 (1957),
that laches is not even available as a defense in a quiet title
action.

Assuming, arguendo, that laches could be available here:
The question whether the suit is barred
by reason of laches is not to be determined
by reference to any particular period as
compared with the time during which the
complainant delayed seeking to quiet his
title.
In this respect, a solution of the
question as to laches vel non depends upon
the circumstances of the case.
(65 Am.Jur.2d
Quieting Title § 57 at 188.)
Furthermore, it is stated at 27 Am.Jur.2d

Equity § 163

at 703:
Lapse of time, although manifestly an
important consideration in determining
whether relief will be barred in equity
because of laches, is not of itself decisive.
That is to say, lapse of time is only one,
and, moreover, not ordinarily the controlling
-17-
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or most important one, of the elements to be
considered in determining the exercise and
application of laches as a defense in a suit
of equity.
(M]ere delay in the assertion of a claim does not, of itself, amount
to laches.
This is obviously so where the
complainant can show an excuse for his failure
to seek relief more promptly.
So, generally,
the fact that the complainant has delayed to
bring suit will not alone be held to have
barred him of relief.
Among the facts and circumstances to be considered in
determining whether laches is applicable is the relationship of
the parties, 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 162 at 702, and especially
intimate or confidential relations, Id. § 165 at 707.
It is noteworthy that the plaintiff and defendant Ann:
Hansen are sisters and that Mrs. Neil, plaintiff's
title, was their mother.

predecessM~

It is pointed out in Major v. Shaver,

187 F.2d 211, 212 (D.C.Cir. 1951):
[I]n considering questions of laches, the
utmost leniency is manifested by the courts
where it appears that the delay is due to the
intimate personal relations existing between
the parties and the high degree of confidence
reposed by one in another.
In such case, and
especially when a family relation exists, the
same degree of diligence is seldom required.
Likewise, another excuse for delay is when the plaintiff is in
possession of the subject property under claim of title.

See JC

C.J.S. Equity§ 116 at 62; 74 C.J.S, Quieting Title § 49 at 70;
27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 165 at 708.
of limitations.

The same is true of statutes

It is stated in Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d

133, 138 (Okla. 1963):

-18-
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[A]n action to quiet title, where the plaintiff has been in continuous possession of
property, claiming ownership therein, can be
maintained at any time, and no statute of
limitation bars his right to the relief
sought.
Admittedly, Shirley Rodgers has not herself been in continuous
possession of the property.

However, her predecessor in title,

her mother, was in continuous possession of the property until
her death (Tr. 20), less than three weeks before the filing of
the instant case.

It is significant that Mrs. Neil, especially

during her last years, was quite ill and did not wish to sue her
own daughter (Tr. 35).

Clearly, the family relationship of the

Hansens, Mrs. Rodgers and Mrs. Neil, as well as Mrs. Neil's
continuous possession of the property, provide an excuse for
passage of time without instituting suit.
It also is stated in Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First
National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 515, 57 P.2d 1099, 1125
(1936), that laches is not a matter of mere delay but rather
involves standing by watching one change his position.

Likewise,

in Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 148-49, 232 P.2d 769
(1951), it is stated:
The equitable doctrine of laches is
founded upon considerations of time and
injury.
"Laches in legal significance is
not mere delay, but delay that works a
disadvantage to another." Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed. § 1442;
Chase v. Chase, 20 R.I. 202, 37 A. 804.
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. The question of laches can only
be determined under the circumstances of each
case and there must be a finding that the
delay has inequitably prejudiced the defendant before the remedy is barred.
Likewise, in Flora v. Gusman, 76 Idaho 188, 279 P.2d 1067 (19::
which discusses at length the factors which mitigate

applicat~

of the doctrine of laches, it is stated:
[T]he defense of laches does not apply where
unnecessary to protect adverse party from
being placed in worse condition than he would
have been had action been prosecuted with
greater diligence; and .
circumstances of
each case must govern courts of equity in
permitting defense of laches to be made.
[279 P.2d at 1072.]
The lower court did conclude that the Hansens suffer;.
v~:

prejudice to their case because of passage of time and "by

of their expenditure of money for the property in the belief ti.:
they had a clear unencumbered right thereto."

Howev;:

( R. 114 )

this is totally at var"-ance with the facts of this case.

Firs:

of all, the loss of the "star witness," Mrs. Neil, clearly
prejudiced Mrs. Rodgers' case more than the Hans ens'.

Second!;

the Hansens' unsubstantiated claims to having expended large ;;:
of money, allegedly in improving the property, and that they
performed maintenance and upkeep on the property should be
considered completely insufficient to establish any monetary
detriment.
The sum total of their claims is that they helped
finance repair of the front porch and the building of a room::
the back (R. 74) although no figures were given, that they ga'

-20-
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~rs.

Neil money, in an unspecified amount, to help pay taxes

without ever knowing how it was spent (Tr. 74-75), and that some
plumbing and electrical work was done (Tr. 75).

This hardly

amounts to hard proof any expenditures were even made or to some
form of detrimental reliance.

Even assuming that such payments

were made and such repairs performed, it must be remembered that
Mrs. Neil was the mother and mother-in-law of the defendants.

It

would seem odd indeed if one would refuse to assist his or her
mother unless some claim to her property was involved.

Very

little significance should be attached to efforts at helping a
widowed mother keep her home in repair and property taxes up to
date, especially in the instant case in view of the fact that
other family members often chipped in to help in similar ways
financially (Tr. 25-26).
Also, it is undisputed that defendants claim that
Mrs. Neil had a duty to pay taxes and a right to use the property
for the duration of her life (R. 73).

Therefore, they have not

been placed in any worse condition than if the suit had been
brought earlier.

Assuming the validity of their claims, they

would not have come into possession of the property until after
the death of their mother and this suit was brought within three
weeks after that occurrence.
Clearly, both the doctrine of laches and statutes of
limitations were totally inappropriate in this case and did not
constitute a bar to the action.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ONLY
A ONE-THIRD INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY RATHER THAN A ONE-HALF
INTEREST.
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff/appellant should nc·
prevail on the main thrust of her appeal for a reversal of the
judgment or a new trial, she still should be entitled to a onehalf share of the subject property rather than the one-third
interest found by the lower court.

This is so because of sound

common law principles of construction of deeds.
The warranty deed of 1944

(Ex. 2-P) covering the

subject property was executed by William and Vivian Newsome

·~

Myrtle C. Neil and Annie N. Hansen and Albert J. Hansen, her
husband, as joint tenants and not as tenants in common."

Assum:

this deed establishes the ownership of the subject property,
Mrs. Rodgers, as successor in interest to Myrtle C. Heil, shoulC
take a one-half interest in the property and the Hansens takeG
other one-half interest.

This is based first upon the general

rule that a conveyance to three people, two of whom are husband
and wife, results in the husband and wife taking one half

of~

estate and the third party taking the other half of the estate.
This rule is based upon the common law presumption that a conve:
ance to a husband and wife results in the two persons taking as
one, since the common law viewed a married couple as one persor
That principle carries over into the situation, as in the insti:
case, when property is conveyed to a husband and wife and
third person:
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so~

Where property is conveyed or devised to
husband and wife and a third person or
persons, the husband and wife, being one
person in law, will together take only an
undivided moiety or half of the estate,
leaving the other half to the third person .
. . As between themselves, husband and wife
are tenants by entirety of their share, but
as to third persons they are together a joint
tenant or tenant in common with him.
(41
C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 3l(f) at 454.]
The essence of this first basis for contending appellant
is entitled to one half rather than one third of the subject
property is the common law concept of tenancy by the entirety and
tenancy by the entirety exists in Utah.

Admittedly, there are no

cases from this Court recognizing its existence, but there likewise are no cases abolishing it.

Therefore, it must exist

because it is a common law concept and the common law is specifically adopted in Utah unless abrogated by statute, Utah Code
Annotated § 68-3-1 (1968).

Similarly, there is no statute

specifically establishing tenancy by the entirety in Utah, but
there is no statute abolishing or abrogating this common law
concept.

More importantly in the area of statutory law, three

separate statutes implicitly recognize tenancy by the entirety by
mentioning it:

Utah Code Annotated § 78-41-1 (1977), on termina-

tion of life estates, recognizes the existence of "tenancy by the
entirety."
§

Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-1003 (Supp. 1977)

[formerly

74-5-3], a section of the Simultaneous Death Act, refers to

"tenants by the entirety."

This provision was re~nacted by the

Legislature only two years ago when the Probate Code was revamped.
1975 Utah Laws, ch. 150, § 3.

Finally, Utah Code Annotated § 48-
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1-4 (2)

(1970), a section of the Partnership Act, states that

"tenancy by entireties

. does not of itself establish a

partnership."
Appellant's position is also based on the precise
manner of stating the conveyance as, in essence,

"to A and B

a~~

C, her husband," rather than "to A!.... Band C, her husband."
Because of the use of the word "and" rather than a comma be twee:.
the name of Mrs. Neil and the husband and wife unit of the
Hans ens, it is clear that Mrs. Neil was treated as one separate
unit and the Hansens as a second.

In that instance, each unit

receives one half of the property conveyed.
The case of Eeatter v. Lucas, 367 Pa.

296, 80 A.2d

74~

(1951), illustrates each of these premises for plaintiff's
contention.

The Heatter case involves a deed to "Francis Lucas,

a single man, and Joseph Lucas and Matilda Lucas, his wife."
There is no indication in the clause as to what estate each par:
takes.

Nevertheless, this case is important because it constne

the significance of the phrase "his wife" and the importance of
employing the conj unction "and," instead of using a comma, when
delineating the grantees.

The court first noted that a

convey~

to three parties, two of whom are married but not designated as
such, shall normally be deemed a conveyance of one third of the
estate to each party.

Then the court distinguished the case

under consideration stating:
Here the conveyance is to "Francis
Lucas, a single man, and Joseph Lucas and
Matilda Lucas, his wife." The words "his
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wife" cannot be treated as mere surplusage;
they occur in context in the classic form for
the creation of the tenancy by the entirety.
The parties must be taken to have considered
and given significance to the marital status
of two of the grantees.

In the instant case the two grantees are
in fact husband and wife, and the designation
"his wife" sufficiently imports an intention
that they shall take as such.
Further, the
conjunction "and," here used, is unnecessary
if the parties were intended to take undivided
one third parts; the use of the word "and"
has separated the grantees into two units (1)
Francis and (2) Joseph and Matilda.
(80 A.2d
at 752.]
Finally, the court noted that there was no restraint forbidding
the creation of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common where one
part of the tenancy was a combination of the husband and wife as
tenants by the entirety.
The Heatter case goes right to the heart of the objections raised below by the defendants that, because Utah Code
Annotated § 57-1-5 (1974) requires the interests of joint tenants
to be equal and undivided, each of the Hansens is entitled to one
third of the estate.

Clearly, as noted above, this might well

be the case when the married couple is not designated as such.
However, here they are designated as a married couple and the
words "her husband" cannot be treated as "mere surplusage."
Furthermore, as in Heatter, there is no restraint, even in § 57-

1-S, forbidding the creation of a joint tenancy or tenancy in
common between a single person as one tenant and a husband-wife
tenancy by the entirety as another tenant.
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Likewise, the case of In re Buttnow, 4 9 Misc. 2d 445,
267 N.Y.S. 2d 740 (1966), involved a deed to "Anelia M. Bakowsk,
widow, and Josephine Katherine Buttnow, married to Alexander M.
Buttnow, married to Josephine Katherine,

jointly, all of Port

Jefferson Station, Long Island, New York."

The court found

t~t

husband and wife received a one-half interest in the estate, but
as tenants in the entirety, and that the third party, Anelia
Bakowski, received the other half of the estate, as tenant in
common to the husband and wife.

It was noted that the critical

factor in determining the meaning of the phrase in question is
the "intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the
deed."

The court felt that the designation of the Buttnows as

husband and wife was indicative of the grantor's intention to
convey to them a tenancy by the entirety.

The court held that

such a designation was probative of such an intent.

The court

also noted that the separation of the estates to 1'.nelia Bakowski
and the husband and wife by the word "and" indicated an intenUo:
by the grantor to apply the term "jointly" only to the husband
and wife.
The case of Daniel v. Wright, 352 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1972), dealt with a deed "to Herbert L. Wright and Mattie G.
Wright, his wife, and Pauline E. Liner . . . as Joint Tenants."
The court noted that the term "Joint Tenants" appears to modif)
all of the three names involved.

However, the court awarded a

one-half interest to the Wrights and the other one-half interesc
to Ms. Liner.

In the District of Columbia a conveyance to a
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husband and wife as joint tenants creates a tenancy by the
entirety and the court rested its decision on that principle,
essentially that the Wrights, as a married couple, took only one
half as one person.
Also, the opinion in Mosser v. Dolsay, 132 N.J. Eq.
121, 27 A.2d 155 (1942),

interprets a granting clause similar in

nature to the one in the instant case, which states:
[To] Ralph Mosser of the Burough of Wanaque,
County of Passaic, and State of New Jersey,
and Frank Dolsay and Emma Dolsay, his wife,
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common,
with rights of survivorship incident thereto.
The court, quoting Freeman on Co-tenancy and Partition
§

70, stated:
The husband and wife not only take an
entire estate as one person when it is granted
to them, but they are also regarded as one
person in any conveyance made to them and
others, and therefore take but one moiety.
Thus, if a deed be made to A and wife and B,
here A and wife take together but one-half.
This is true whether the conveyance be intended
to create a joint-tenancy or a tenancy in
common.
[ 27 A. 2d at 157.]
In summary, should Mrs. Rodgers, as successor to Myrtle

Neil, take only the interest Mrs. Neil took in the warranty deed
from the Newsomes, without regard to any other factors present in
this case, she should take a one-half interest.
reasons for this are:

The two basic

First, a conveyance to a husband and wife

is a conveyance to one person and, therefore, a conveyance to a
husband and wife and another person is a conveyance of a one-half
interest to the husband and wife as one person and a one-half
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interest to the other person.

This position is strengthened

where the grantor explicitly notes the marital status of the
parties.

Second, use of the conjunction "and," instead of a

comma, between the name of a third person and the names of the
married couple in a deed is presumptive evidence that the parti:·
were not intended to take three equal interests in the estate k
rather two.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the decision of tr
trial court was totally contrary to the clear and convincing
evidence that Myrtle C. Neil took title to the subject property
as sole fee owner in 1944 subject only to the equitable mortgage
of the Hansens.

Further, when Mrs. Neil quitclaimed her intern:

to appellant Shirley Rodgers in 1971, Mrs. Rodgers in turn becarr:
the sole fee owner.

Therefore the judgment of the lower court

must be reversed and judgment entered for appellant or a new
trial must be granted.
Appellant further submits that her claim is not barrec
by any of the technical defenses raised by the Hansens--statute
of frauds,

statute of limitations, or laches--and that the court·

erred in applying them.
Finally, appellant submits that,

in the event this

Court finds for respondents on each of the above issues, she
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-still is entitled to a one-half interest in the subject property
rather than the one-third interest awarded by the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of October, 1977.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
A copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed,
postage prepaid and properly addressed, -to Steven H. Gunn, of and
for Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, attorneys for respondents, 400 Deseret
Building, 79 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
20th day of October, 1977.
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